The Right to Strike: A Defence

Written By: J.Noonan - Sep• 17•14

Strike rates in Canada have been in decline since the 1980’s.   In the 1980’s  there was an annual average of 541 workdays lost per 1,000 employees.  By the 1990’s, this average had dropped to 233.  By the 2000s’s the average had declined further, to 203, far less than half the 1980’s rate.  The drop is not attributable to more enlightened labour policies– the same time line demonstrates growing inequality between those who derive their income from labour and those who derive it from invested capital (see Thomas Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century).  So what explains the long term trend?  There are two clear factors which reciprocally influence each other.  First, differences in labour costs and the scope and depth of legal protections have been exploited by international capital.  Zones of lower labour cost and weaker legal protections for unions and workers have acted as attractors of capital.  More mobile international capital has put pressure on states-  whose legitimacy largely depends upon their ability to ensure economic growth as measured by standard capitalist metrics– to prove to international capital that they are “open for business.”  In practice this cliché means– and this is the second factor–competition with low wages zones to drive down labour costs through coordinated attacks on existing labour law and unions.  These changes have made it more difficult to strike, on the one hand, and more risky, on the other.

A glaring example of the dangers of striking occurred in February of 2012, when workers in London, Ontario were taught a brutal object lesson in the reality of global capitalism.  Then Canadian Auto Workers on strike against the locomotive maker Electro-motive were given an impossible choice.  The company (a subsidiary of Caterpillar) demanded that the union agree to cut their existing wages in half, or face the closure of the plant.  Seeing that what was at stake was not just their plant, but the future of the union movement in the Ontario manufacturing sector, these workers heroically sacrificed themselves, went on strike, and watched their livelihood move to Muncie, Indiana.  Had they not stood up to the brutish tactics of Electro-motive, every manufacturer in the country would have been encouraged to make the same demands.  What boss wouldn’t want to cut her or his workers’ wages in half?  While the jobs were lost, the massive public outcry against legalized extortion preserved the possibility of meaningful collective bargaining in other plants, at least for the time being.

The heroism of the Electro-motive workers brings me to my main point.  Strikes are generally derided as selfish, as morally (if not physically) violent, because they “use”  people not directly party to the dispute as tools to secure the union’s victory, and as counter-productive.  What is worse is that these criticisms are generally not leveled by the owners of capital (they understand that in current conditions most strikes are doomed to fail after a fairly short period, so they do not need to get apoplectic in the press).  Rather, the criticisms tend to stem from the “general public”  the vast majority of whom must work for a living and would thus materially benefit from any improvements that successful strikes might win.   In all the hue and cry about “using”  innocent people as pawns, the violence to which working people are regularly subjected is almost never mentioned.  This violence is sometimes overt–as when 34 striking Platinum miners were murdered in Marikana, South Africa in 2012–  but more often invisible from the outside:  the ever increasing stress of rising workloads and fewer workers, the ever present threat of lay off, of losing benefits, of having one’s pension evaporate in a bankruptcy court.  Those already defeated, instead of taking heart from those still willing to fight, cheer from the sidelines, for their own side’s defeat!

Strikers are derided as selfish, while they in fact are the people who suffer the most.  They forgo pay, they suffer the opprobrium of myopic critics, they risk physical attack, and they risk  their jobs.

Yes, it is true, people can get caught in the middle.  But anyone who thinks that people go on strike to punish third parties has never been on strike.  People go on strike (at this point in history, at any rate) only in response to the most serious provocations.  For many workers, who live pay cheque to pay cheque, those provocations generally involve the threat of reduced wages.  For the temerity of demanding a living wage they will be denounced as greedy.  Note to anonymous comment trolls:  “greed” refers to the desire to amass wealth without  limit.  Demanding a pay increase of x-% is, by definition, a limited a demand, and therefore not greedy.   For others, (very few, today), still well-remunerated workers, the provocations can take other forms– serious threats to long established workplace rights, job security or pensions being the most common.  In a society supposedly free and democratic, ought not people willing to stand up to protect their rights– rights which others can and ought to enjoy too– be celebrated, rather than demonized?

Yet, given the very real stresses, difficulties, and dangers of striking, given the precarity of almost everyone’s job today, is it not the height of irrationality to strike?  In some cases the answer might be “yes.”  And, as I said above, no group of workers strikes for frivolous  reasons.  But what if current trends continue and workers the world over become too cowed to ever strike?  What will have been lost?  Some would say:  “nothing,”  others:  “a nuisance.”  But these answers, when not rooted in simple class prejudice, are extraordinarily out of touch with the history of democratic development.  Democracy, or those elements of it that exist, had to be fought for, because no ruling group has ever willingly limited its power to exploit those below.

When we focus on depth values, it becomes evident that what critics of the right to strike miss is that the right to withdraw labour is one of the crucial distinctions between being a worker and being a slave.  Slaves were the legal property of their masters; they worked when they were commanded and rested when they were allowed; they had no input into their conditions of work.  Marx used the concept of “wage-slavery” to emphasize the continuities between capitalism and slave economies, but he was not being ironic when he argued that the distinguishing characteristic of capitalism was that its workers were free.  Of course, the material compulsion exerted by the need to earn money is normally sufficient to limit the exercise of this freedom to trivial and non-threatening forms.  At the same time, legal freedoms are spaces carved out by struggle which workers can use to expand their collective agency and their collective and individual well-being.  Marx was always clear about the importance of trade unions in the struggle for democracy, and the importance of the struggle for democracy to the struggle for socialism.   As he noted, it took centuries of struggle for working people to achieve the legal right to freely associate in unions and to legally withdraw their labour:  “Only against its will and under the pressure of the masses did the English Parliament give up its laws against Strikes and Trades Unions, after it had itself, for 500 years, held, with shameless egoism, the position of a permanent Trades’ Union of the capitalists against the labourers.”(Capital, Volume 1, p. 691).   The right to strike is material proof that workers are human beings who have the capacity to help intelligently shape their conditions of life.  Behind this power stands the real object of ruling class fears–  the capacity of working people to recognise the superfluity of capital to the provision and institutionalization of the material and social conditions of life.  Lest that power be felt by too many workers, the right to strike has always been precarious– long denied, won only through the harshest of struggles, and always in danger of being undermined, by armed violence, by legal coercion, or by global market pressures.

Anyone who has been on strike has felt that power, the eros of common struggle, the euphoria of solidarity.  Anyone who has been on strike for more than few days has also felt these feelings of collective democratic power wane.  Strikes are very hard work, undertaken under conditions of extreme stress, in ever worsening economic conditions for the strikers.  But sometimes (not all the time) accepting some hardship is necessary to prove that one’s position in a  hierarchy does not determine the degree of one’s humanity.   Human beings determine the conditions of their social lives through the work that they do and the relationships that they build.  If people have no say over their conditions of work, they cannot meaningfully be called free human beings.  And sometimes it is necessary to struggle to protect or extend our rights as workers to help determine our conditions of work.

Of course,  it would be best to live in a world in which all disagreements were resolved through uncoerced negotiation and compromise.  But that world would  require deep agreement upon the purposes of social life and the democratic control over the resources needed to realise those purposes.  Sadly, that is not the world we inhabit.  So long as we do not live in that world, those most subject to the harms of unconstrained market forces, to austerity policies, to the power of capital and its servants, need means of protecting themselves, and the right to strike is one of those means.





Written By: J.Noonan - Sep• 10•14

The basil grows fragrantly alive

as I pluck its leaves,

but all I can think is:

What needs to be done tomorrow?


Is there a law that says

I shall not enjoy the sun,

Gently caressing my skin now,

its angle falling towards autumn?


Why is it better to struggle

than to tarry on this pier,

watch the boys test their mettle

against the lapping river,

and listen to the silence of ships

as they glide past,

bound for Duluth or Montreal?


I want know:

Why can’t I enjoy the cool humidity of my sweat

as I strain, pedalling hard against the slope,

stealing glances at the northern skyline,

still and silent as a painting,

too big for even Christo to imagine?


Who commanded:

Those who  give a fuck must sacrifice these moments?

And for what?

Didn’t sans cullotes just become lumpenproletariat?

Always the same, no,

some smell shit,

others smell basil?


[A Logically Possible Prayer:

O Sun, glint on the water and dance with my eyes

and then burn my papers,

vaporise the solder that holds together

this machine architecture through which I do my duty].


But I do not believe in prayers,

even those only logically possible,

so I have learned to float.

It’s easy, there are no incantations,

just swallow, drink, inhale.

Time expands, space contracts.


For a moment, there is just me,



But gravity is too powerful,

it drags even thoughts back to earth,

home of no lingering,

of endings and heavy beginnings,

that a gossamer instant of untension

is too frail to stop.


There is no reprieve.


Windsoria, September  10th, 2014.

A Labour Day Gift for Sisters and Brothers: Collective Bargaining in the Age of Unnecessary Austerity

Written By: J.Noonan - Sep• 01•14

I first published this essay in The Scoop, Issue 134, August 29th, 2014, Windsor, ON.  Thanks to the publishers for allowing me to repost it.

University Administration Tactics Threat to Labour Movement

On July 18th, 2014 the administration of the University of Windsor informed the Windsor University Faculty Association that they would cease to bargain.  Instead of continuing what had been a productive—if hard-nosed– set of negotiations, the administration chose to walk away.  But not only that, four days later, on July 22nd, a letter from President Alan Wildeman informed WUFA members that his administration would be imposing the terms and conditions of work contained in the July 18th offer.

The unilateral, authoritarian move has understandably alarmed and angered WUFA members.  It ought to alarm and anger all unionised workers in the city.  It is not a well-known fact that  employers have the right, under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, to dictate terms and conditions of work in the absence of a signed collective agreement.  It is not a well-known fact because most employers chose not to exercise this right.   So why is the University of Windsor administration behaving more like Caterpillar, (who moved their Electro-motive locomotive plant from London to Muncie, Indiana two years ago after insisting on impossible-to-grant concessions from their workers),  and less like academic colleagues devoting some of their career to administrative duties?

The answer is complex.  It involves intensified pressures on public universities as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and austerity ideology, endless demands from government for ‘accountability’ measures that waste time and resources but make administrators feel like they are the only people standing between the institution and oblivion, and policies that have put universities and other institutions of higher education in competition with each other, increasing the pressure of market forces and making administrators feel more like bosses in private business than colleagues in  a university.

These factors are important, but on their own insufficient explanations of the Wildeman administration’s approach to bargaining.  These pressures exist across the university sector and our sister institutions have been able to settle fair collective agreements.  In the past couple of weeks Carleton and Brock have settled difficult negotiations on terms better than currently being offered by the University of Windsor, even though Windsor is not in worse financial shape than either.

In addition to the political economic pressures being exerted on all public universities, Windsor seems to suffer from a leadership style that has no place in a twenty-first century public university in a democratic country.

Leadership is important.  Boldness of vision is important.  Investment is important.  No one faults the President for doing his job, articulating a vision, or investing in new infrastructure and buildings.  But investments are supposed to create work, not come at the expense of it.  Over the last six years the University of Windsor has lost 48 full-time faculty while increasing its enrolments modestly.  That means fewer courses, larger class sizes, and a threat to the comprehensive nature of the University of Windsor.

It does not have to be this way.  Universities are not for profit business in which the owners appropriate the surplus as private property.  There is no structural conflict of interest between administration and faculty in the way there is between owners and workers.  If relations between administrators and faculty take on the adversarial character of relations between owners and bosses, it is because administrators start to act like bosses.  (Faculty members typically are more interested in their own research and teaching than union politics).

The problem at Windsor takes the form of an administration that simply cannot get along with its workers, its faculty, or its students. Last year CUPE 1393 was on strike for more than a month.  The President regularly took to the press to denounce the CUPE leadership for not understanding fiscal realities.  Last March, an attempt by students to organize a boycott of products made in the occupied West Bank created a campus wide controversy which, while sharp, is just the sort of controversy one hopes for on a university campus.  It potentially gave students an opportunity to put into practice the communication, argumentation, and criticism skills they are supposedly here to learn.  But rather than let students democratically figure out a solution on their own, the President intervened to effectively suspend student government and take over the finances of the University of Windsor Student Alliance.  This shocking move came after an organized protest was successful in preventing the election of a full slate of UWSA councillors.  Now, as summer of 2014 draws to a close and the beginning of the fall term nears, the University again finds itself at a critical moment.  Instead of finishing the job of negotiating a collective agreement with WUFA, Wildeman has once again put his interpretation of the problems ahead of democratic deliberation and compromise and has attempted to impose terms he finds acceptable on the faculty.

Faculty, of course, have rejected this unilateralism.  On August 14th ,we took a successful strike vote.  81.4% of faculty voted in favour of job action if it proves necessary to achieve a negotiated agreement.   Regardless of what Windsorites may think of the university’s offer (and it is not as generous as it has been made out to be by the administration or The Windsor Star, and does not meet norms in our sector), all working people have to be concerned, and ought to raise their voice against, the tactics of the administration.  For most working people, terms and conditions of employment are arbitrarily dictated by management.  The great benefit of belonging to a union—indeed, the great advance for democracy represented by the union movement—is that unions enable working women and men to help shape their work conditions through the collective bargaining process.  If the university administration’s draconian tactics are allowed to stand, the hard won rights of collective bargaining are put in jeopardy for all workers.

Please visit WUFA’s website: for more information on solidarity actions and WUFA’s position on the state of negotiations.  If you are alarmed by the unilateralism and authoritarianism of the tactics being pursued, please email President Wildeman to voice your opposition:




Pattern Recognition

Written By: J.Noonan - Aug• 27•14

Shout Louder God, I Couldn’t Hear You

Maybe, apostate that I am, God is not talking to me.  Either that or my hearing is not as good as I thought it was.  I say this because God has been raising his voice in Missouri, but I had to find out about it from CNN.  According to the Reverend Fred D. Robinson,  “What God is Screaming”  in Ferguson, MO is for America finally to face up to its history of structural racism.  Now, one might ask a) why God would have thrown its lot in with a country premised upon the racial violence of the slave trade, and b) why it has taken so many instances of racist abuse for God to raise its voice?  But who am I to question the Divine, I, who cannot even hear its voice.  What I can hear and understand is the political point the Reverend is making:  angry demonstrations are not accidents, or the fault of  “a few troublemakers.”  They are predictable and legitimate responses to long-standing patterns of injustice.

Boy, Stephen Harper Dislikes Sociology

I am sure that Canada’s most Reverend Stephen Harper thinks he hears the divine voice too, but so far as I can tell, in a whisper, because I cannot recall any instance of his claiming to have been publicly directed to a course of action by the Almighty.  Too bad.  The Eternal could have explained to Harper, as it is explaining, loudly, to Americans, that a) there are patterns in social life, and b) the existence of patterns is strong evidence that there are underlying structural causes at work.  None of this sociology for our great helmsman, who boldly steers social science back through the twenty-first, twentieth, nineteenth, and eighteenth century to the fictional state of nature where there is no society, no social forces or powers, no social structures of any type, just “individuals,” their choices, and their responsibility for them.  Now the seventeenth century, it had a god who wore big boy pants, smiting the guilty and leaving the shouting about “causes”  to the professors.

Yes, there is a specter haunting 24 Sussex Drive again, the specter of sociology.  In 2013, remember, after an alleged plot to blow up a VIA rail train was “foiled,”  Harper warned Canadians that it was not the time to “commit sociology” by searching for underlying causes for terrorism.  Last week, in response to the murder of 15 year old Tina Fontaine in Winnipeg, the Prime Minister was once again preaching against the dangers of looking for causes.  There are no causes, there is no social injustice, there is no history of institutionalized racism against Canada’s First Nations, there is no systematic threat to aboriginal women.  Crime is “not a sociological phenomenon,”  according to Harper, in one of the most stunningly non-sensical claims I have ever heard a person with a post-graduate degree assert.  Perhaps because that degree happens to be in economics he really does believe that choices arise ex nihilo from atomic selves pursuing their own interest.

That the individuals who commit crimes have made choices is a tautology.  The interesting question is not :  did person ‘a’ choose to commit the crime he committed (if there were no choice, there would have been no crime), but rather, why, if crimes are purely a function of the atomic choices of distinct individuals, are there patterns of criminal behaviour and victimization?  Why are young black men in Missouri more at risk of being killed by the police than young white men in Connecticut?  Why do rates of violent crime track poverty rates?  Why do aboriginal women in Canada, who make up approximately 3  per cent of the Canadian population,  make up approximately 10 % of homicide victims?   If there is no structural explanation for that statistic, that would be an anomaly beyond belief.  Clearly, the question that Canadian society has to ask itself is:  what are the factors that explain why aboriginal women are in such dangerous proximity to men who choose to murder them?

Preaching, Practice

I do not know whether we need an inquiry to answer that question.  But whether one favours an inquiry or not, every thinking person has to accept that there are social structures and dynamics that affect differently identified groups of people differently.  If there are only individuals and choices, then holding individuals to account suffices. But suffices for what?  A guilty verdict holds the individual accountable for what he did, but it does not explain why he did it.  Guilty verdicts do not get us closer to understanding the causes of patterns of crime.  Therefore, they do not get us closer to solving violence as a social problem..  There is no contradiction, (as Harper seems to think there is) between social scientific understanding and individual responsibility.  In fact, the relationship is the opposite–  it is only when we understand the real forces at work on individuals that responsibility becomes a meaningful category.

If all the justice system does is incarcerate particular individuals, it leaves the structures of social injustice in place.  That failure to address causes guarantees work for itself as social conditions manufacture the same sorts of people who commit the same sorts of crimes.  To be fair, though, it is unreasonable to expect that one social institution acting in isolation will be able solve deep-seated social problems.  The Reverend Robinson is correct– Ferguson (or Winnipeg) is a  test.  But it is not God that asking the questions, it is the racially subaltern asking white Americans , and the people of the First Nations asking  Canadians, if we will take responsibility for the history of domination we are parts of (even those of us who opposite it in theory and practice).  It is amazing how quickly people who preach individual responsibility point in every other direction when it is they who are asked to accept responsibility for themselves.

Readings: Thomas Picketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Written By: J.Noonan - Aug• 16•14

As a book-object, Picketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century reminds me of nothing so  much as my Progress Publishers hardcover and onion skin edition of Marx’s Capital, which I picked up for a few dollars when the Communist Party of Canada liquidated its warehouse on Spadina Ave. 25 years ago.   Harvard University Press has produced a handsome tome indeed, and there can be little doubt that the marketers hoped to play on the shared title to help move the product.  On the dust-jacket, “Capital”  is three times the size of “In the Twenty-First Century.”  Stylistically, too, the book, with its expansive historical vistas, its personal digressions, its illustrations drawn from literature, and its rhetorical positioning of itself as the antidote to collapse, reminds one of its namesake.  Picketty the writer lacks the power of Marx’s poetry.  But there is a Marx-like commitment to science for the sake of social action, a disdain for academic hairsplitting and obscurantism, and an honesty about the severity of the problems the world faces.

But capital in the twenty-first century is no Capital:  A Critique of Political Economy.  As Marxist critics like David Harvey and Tomas Tengely-Evans have noted, Picketty is not a critic of capitalist society as a whole, or the basic assumptions about the nature of capital, or the legitimacy of private property in universally required natural resources, or the meaning and value of economic growth in capitalism, or markets as resource distributors, or the exploitation and alienation of labour.   The book is  a very much needed demonstration, against prevailing economic orthodoxy and neo-liberal ideology, that capitalist markets do not produce prosperity for all but ever widening inequality (as Marx also argued, albeit in different terms).  But it does not question the ruling money-value system of the capitalist economy, or focus on the material impossibility of limitless economic growth.  It does not offer, in other words, a comprehensive and systematic alternative to capitalist society.  Still what it does offer is of signal importance to anyone who is theoretically and practically engaged in the task of trying to reconstruct such an alternative.  Socialists of the twenty-first century need to read Capital in the Twenty-First Century and learn from it.

The Argument

This is a large and complex work divided into four Parts.  The first explains the difference between income and capital and the relationship between them.  This section lays the theoretical foundation for the substantive arguments of Parts Two to Four.  Part Two examines the historical evolution of the capital/income ratio.  Understanding the forces that affect this ratio is essential to Picketty’s main aim, elaborated in Part Three, of explaining the patterns of inequality he observes from the late nineteenth to the early twenty-first century.  Finally, in Part Four he makes concrete proposals for reducing the growing inequality he observes.  I will not comment separately on each part but instead construct an overview of the argument as a whole.

To begin, we need to understand what Picketty means by income and capital.  Income is a flow that “corresponds to the quantity of goods produced and distributed in a given period.” (p.51).  Capital he treats as a stock, “the sum total of f nonhuman assets that can be owned and exchanged on some market.”(p. 46)  On first glance, there seems to be an insurmountable difference between what Marx’s and Picketty’s definition.  As both Harvey and Tegely-Evans point out, for Marx, capital is essentially a process.  Firms exploit labour to produce commodities which, when sold at a profit, realise the surplus value labour produced.  This money is then re-invested to expand the cycle of production.  That is why Marx called capital value that creates more value.   For Picketty, profits are not counted as capital, but as income.  That which he calls capital Marx would have viewed as accumulated capital– dead labour, in his terms.  The difference, however, while significant, is not absolute, because Picketty discovers a dynamic at work similar in the most important political respects to what Marx observed.  Unless there is consistent real growth of output, “capitalists do indeed dig their own grave:  either they tear each other apart in a desperate attempt to combat the falling rate of profit … or they force labor to accept a smaller and smaller share of national income, which ultimately leads to a proletarian revolution.”  (pp.228-9) Picketty is talking about the past,  but he does not them as possible futures.

These are futures that he thinks can be avoided because he is hopeful that it is always possible “to find new and useful things to do with capital.” (p.221)  Thus, he believes that constant real growth is in principle economically possible (whether it is materially possible is a question he touches on only in passing, and a problem to which I will return in my conclusion).  So long as there is growth of productivity, capitalism can survive.  “To sum up, modern growth, which is based on the growth of productivity and the diffusion of knowledge, has made it possible to avoid the apocalypse  predicted by Marx and to balance the process of  capital accumulation.”(p.234).   On the other hand, just because the apocalypse has been prevented, it does not follow that it will  be staved off forever, as Picketty reminds the reader.  However, the horseman is more likely to be levels of incompatible with cohesive democratic societies than the falling rate of profit.  The central economic argument of Picketty’s book is to explain why growth of inequality is not an accident but a structural feature essential to capitalism.

The historical evolution of capitalism can be understood according to what Picketty calls two fundamental laws.  The first law describes capital’s share of the national income.(p. 52)  Mathematically, it is expressed as:

α=r X β

where α= the share of  capital in the national income (i.e., the share derived from rent on real estate, stock market or bond market investments, and so on, as opposed to wages or salaries);

 r= the rate of return on capital (for example r=5% means that on a 1 million dollar investment one would earn 50 000$/year);

and β = the capital/income ratio, which is the value of capital expressed as a percentage of the national income (on average in the wealthiest countries capital is  worth around six years of national income.  If the national income were 1 trillion dollars, the accumulated capital would be worth 6 trillion, or 600%.

Capital’s share of national income will grow the higher the rate of return on capital.  The higher the rate of return on capital the more it accumulates and the and the higher the capital income ratio becomes.  Growth of the value of α is an important factor in explaining the reasons why inequality is a structural feature of capitalism, but a complete understanding requires the second fundamental law.   The second fundamental law explains how the capital/income ratio is determined. It is expressed mathematically as

β = s/g

where s= the savings rate and g = the rate of growth (corrected for inflation and demographic growth).  In other words, if the money value of output grew by 10 %, with 5% inflation and 3% population growth, there would be, in real terms, 2% economic growth.  Even after factoring in the fact that there are more people claiming a share and each share is worth less, there would still be 2% more available for consumption, investment, and so on.  One does not need to be a mathematician to see that the lower the rate of growth, the higher  the capital-income ratio will be.  Let us start with Picketty’s example.  Assume that in aggregate terms society saves 12% of the national income each year and  the growth rate is 2%, then β will equal 600%.  If we hold the savings rate constant and decrease the rate of growth to 1%, then the value of β would double over the long term, to 1200%  As Picketty explains, “This formula, which can be regarded as the second fundamental law of capitalism, reflects an obvious but important point.  A country that saves a lot and grows slowly will over the long run accumulate an enormous stock of capital.”(p.166).  Were capital divided equally between all citizens, or collectively owned, this accumulation in itself would not pose a problem for social cohesion and justice.  But capital is not equally held.  And in low growth environments (which capitalism has been in for most of the twentieth and all of the twenty-first century, according to Pickety’s statistics), with high rates of savings, β grows.  If most of the capital is held by a small minority, and the capital income ratio is going up, that means that society is becoming more unequal.

While these formulae are not really predictive laws (they do not tell us whether β will grow or not in the future, or even what factors drive growth), they do help explain the structural tendency towards inequality that defines the history of capitalism.  Holdings started out unequal, the more holdings you have the more you can save (where ‘save’ means ‘not spend on consumables’ but invest or otherwise store up).  In low growth environments, the more you can save the more you can earn and the more you earn the more you can reinvest the earnings in more savings.  This dynamic drives inequality.

Picketty’s results contradict what had become the orthodox position on inequality, the work of Stanley Kuznets.  Working in the 1950’s with a more limited data set, but also in the midst of the Cold War (whose politics were more than accidentally connected with his conclusions)  Kuznets argued that the pattern of inequality was an inverted u-shaped curve.  In other words, capital accumulation initially heightened inequalities, but these were gradually reversed as education and higher labour productivity created more wealth. (pp.13-15).  Picketty’s data definitively prove that Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped curve was an anomaly, the effect of the massive destruction of capital in two world wars and redistributive economic policies and investment in public institutions following the war.  In other words, political struggle and public policy can make capitalism more equal, but “it is an illusion to think that something about the nature of modern growth or the laws of the market economy ensures the inequality of wealth will decrease and harmonious stability will be achieved.”  (p.376).   Distributions of wealth are eminently political.

In capitalism, no one gets what they deserve but only what they fight for.  In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, the unprecedented destruction of wealth and resources during World War Two, strong unions in the West, sometimes in alliance with radical students (as in France, 1968)  were able to win political parties to a politics of wealth redistribution and public investment.  The oil shocks and ‘stagflation’ crisis of the 1970’s discredited these policies and the institutions that made them possible– unions, social movements, public corporations and state-funded social services.   A new politics of privatization, globalization of capital flows, tax-rate competition, and union-busting was launched.  The results are clear.  Taking the United States as my example (Picketty’s statistics cover all the largest European and North American economies) the share of total income taken by the top ten percent of was about 50% in 1930, dropped to about 35%  between 1950 and 1970, and then began a steady and still continuing increase to stand at 50% again in 2010.  This U-shaped curve is found in every major European and North American economy.

The structural cause of this long term trend is, to repeat, a low growth and high savings rate combined with organized political attacks on labour and social services.  The higher the rate of return on capital, the more large fortunes will continue to grow regardless of whether they are invested in enterprises which create employment for those who have only their labour to rely upon.  “When growth is slow, it is almost inevitable that this return on capital is higher than the growth rate, which automatically bestows outsized importance on inequalities of wealth accumulated in the past.”(p. 423).  This structural cause (which explains the long term pattern) is combined with deliberate policies of privatization and lowering the taxes on income derived from capital explains the upswing in inequality since the 1970’s:  “the proportion of public capital in national capital has dropped sharply in recent decades … in all eight leading developed economies… In other words, the revival of private wealth is partly due to the privatization of national wealth.”  (p.184)  Of course, this privatization of public wealth was not evenly distributed.  Those who could afford to buy public assets put up for sale added them to their existing, already massively unequal holdings.  The overall result is the accumulation of more and more capital in fewer hands.

The wealthiest are thus freed from the need to work or contribute anything of any life value to anyone else.  With a large and diverse enough portfolio, the wealthiest one percent can live without doing anything productive at all, and continue to increase their fortunes without building anything, creating anything of use for anyone else, or in any way aiding the the sort of growth of need-satisfying economies require.  They can use their financial power to ensure that political parties continue to adopt policies that allow them to accumulate even more capital, and then pass this wealth on to their children, who become spectacularly wealthy without having to do anything more than be born.  Picketty warns that we are returning to the age of the robber baron and the rentier, the age of “patrimonial capitalism,’ in which workers scramble to find lower and lower paying work while the richest one percent control an ever increasing share of national income, not because they do anything to deserve it, but just because they can expect a predictable rate of return on their capital.  “As global growth slows and international competition for capital heats up, there is every reason to believe that r will be much greater than g in the decades  ahead.  If we add to this the fact that the return on capital increases with the size of the initial endowment, a phenomenon that may well be reinforced by the growing complexity of global financial markets, then clearly all the ingredients are in place for the top centile and thousandth of the global wealth distribution to pull farther and farther ahead of the rest.” (p.463)   If this trend continues (and Picketty is clear it will, unless counteracted by oppositional movements) democracy will become impossible.  “The people”  cannot rule themselves if their “countries are owned by their own billionaires” who use their money to create nothing but more money for themselves in a cancerous spiral to the bottom.(p.463).  (For an explanation of the cancerous nature of this devouring of whole societies by the moneyed elite, see John McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism, 2nd edition, 2013).

This is not the news most economists are paid to deliver.  Picketty knows it, and embraces the role of idol smasher enthusiastically, providing the evidence needed to put paid to five key myths of contemporary capitalism.

Five Myths Exposed

1) Perhaps the most commonly heard argument in favour of inequality (and it is not new, but goes back at least to Adam Smith), is that it promotes economic growth from which all classes benefit.  If the more industrious are rewarded with higher incomes, they will be motivated to reinvest that income in productive enterprises, thus creating jobs and public benefits.  While Picketty does not reject this argument out of hand, his statistical analysis reveals that the lower the growth rate, the higher the inequality, proving that there is no positive correlation between inequality and economic efficiency or growth.  “Historical experience shows,”  he concludes, “that such immense inequalities have little to do with the entrepreneurial spirit and are of no use in promoting growth.”(p. 572)  Instead, they represent, as Marx also concluded, the domination of living labour by dead labour.

2) The second myth is that the rich have earned their higher incomes through superior talent and effort.  This is the “meritocratic” argument.  In fact, Picketty accepts the idea of meritocracy, he just demonstrates that the richest people in no way deserve the spectacular fortunes they posses, because the sheer amounts cannot be plausibly explained by proportional superiority of talent.  Picketty (and Marx, for that matter)  do not believe in some mathematical ideal of equality that abstracts from concrete differences of talent and contribution.  What he objects to is the unargued assertion that any degree of inequality is explained by superior merit.  In many cases, the person who currently controls the fortune has contributed nothing to its existence.  As he says of, Liliane Bettencourt, the richest woman in France, “she has never worked a day in her life,” and yet has seen her fortune grow just because other people have invested it for her.  She lives off the labour of others.  Where is the superior talent?

3) The third myth is that education is the royal road to social mobility and greater income inequality.  This myth is the darling especially of the Richard Florida-creative capital crowd, but it is nonsense.  First, the same inequality that characterizes income distributions characterizes the quality of educational  institutions. The richest people go to the richest schools where they learn to organize and govern society so that it is reproduced in ways that preserve their private interests.  “Inequalities of training have largely been translated upward, and there is no evidence that education has really increased intergenerational mobility.”  As for the “creative capital” thesis  there is again no evidence to support it.  In localized contexts, some de-industrialized cities have been able to reinvent themselves (Pittsburgh, for example, or Waterloo, in Ontario), and capital will concentrate in areas where it is already highly concentrated (in the san Francisco bay area in the case of the information technology sector).  These are local phenomenon, however, and do not establish the central claim that we are on the cusp of a new era of spectacular, ‘creativity’ driven growth.  While “skill levels have increased markedly over the past two hundred years”  it is nothing more than “mindless optimism”  to believe that “capital has lost its importance and we have magically gone from a civilization based on capital, inheritance, and kinship to one based on human capital and talent.” (p.224)

4)The fourth myth is that the wave of privatization that has occurred across the globe has contributed to higher economic growth rates.  As I noted above, Picketty demonstrates that it has had negligeable effect on the growth rate and is really a case of redistributing formerly public assets to the ruling class, further enriching them at the expense of the majority of people.(p.184)

5) The final myth that Picketty puts paid to is that the real problem today is not class inequality but intergenerational inequality.   The claim simply abstracts from the observable realities of income inequality, which fall along class lines regardless of the generation.   There are rich young people and rich old people, and their wealth has nothing to do with which “generation” they belong to.  The wealth of the world is not being consumed by the post-World War Two generation; it is, all available evidence suggests, being re-distributed upward to the top centile of the population of the eight wealthiest countries, who will pass it on to their children.  “The concentration of wealth is actually nearly as great within each cohort as it is for the population as a whole.  In other words, and contrary to a widespread belief, intergenerational warfare has not replaced class warfare.”(p. 246)

Cold and unfeeling numbers, clearly presented, are often the most powerful political rhetoric.

The arguments and the evidence are more sophisticated and detailed than I can hope to reproduce in this reading.  They are persuasive, knock-down, as they sometimes say in philosophy.  They destroy the myths of the market and prove beyond any reasonable doubt what the overall goal of neo-liberal policy has been, and what the effects of (more or less) untrammelled market forces are– the concentration of capital and wealth in fewer, richer hands.  Now that we understand the causes of the problem, let us turn in conclusion to Picketty’s solution.

A Tax on Capital?

The boldness of Picketty’s critique of the dynamics of wealth distribution is not matched, unfortunately, by his proposed solution.  After demonstrating in the most convincing fashion that inequality is growing, threatening the social foundations of liberal-democratic society, the only solution Picketty suggests is (by his own admission)  a modest progressive global tax on capital.   His suggested upper rate is 10% on the largest fortunes of one billion or more Euros.  The main purpose of the tax, he argues, “is not to finance the social state, but to regulate capitalism.” (p.518)  It is not clear, however, how such a modest tax could achieve that much grander purpose.  It would not even reduce inequality.   If the largest fortunes increase by  10% per year through wise investment strategies the tax would fix inequality at existing levels.  True, it would stop the growth of inequality, but it would not alter the class structure of capitalism in the least.

But it also does not address the real problems of capitalism, of which inequality of wealth is a symptom.  Capitalism generates inequality of income because it is rooted in inequality of power over life-conditions.  Those who live off of their capital do not need to work; those with no capital do.  This is the fundamental problem of capitalism that underlies all the rest.  Those who live off their capital do so because they own the natural and productive wealth that everyone needs in order to live, develop, and enjoy their lives.  Because they are in a position to determine the life conditions of everyone else, the ruling class can also exercise preponderant control over the institutions of the state.  Since state institutions have the exclusive authority to make law and set public policy, control over the state, rooted in control over life conditions, confers control over law, policy, and the institutions of social life governed by them.  A tax on capital that merely fixes inequalities at existing levels does nothing to address this undemocratic and life destructive structure of power.

Nor does it expose the material irrationality of the ends of a capitalist economy.  Like a shark, capital must move or die.  As we have seen, Picketty agrees with Marx on this point.  However, despite some superficial and unsystematic references to human needs, and a teasing comment about “real democracy and social justice” requiring specific institutions of their own, “not just those of the market”(p.424)  he does not anywhere contest the ruling norm of capitalist society– growth of money value as the supreme end to which life and social institutions must be bent.  What he fails to note is that money-capital growth ultimately depends upon the exploitation of natural and social life-support systems.  When it becomes the sole end of society it threatens and destroys what McMurtry calls the collective life-capital upon which our existence depends.  Collective life capital is “what enables life to reproduce and grow rather than degrade and stagnate through time. We defend it and our health by buying life goods and nothing else. The turning point is as old as physical and cultural evolution. Every human advance is by knowing what enables life from what does not.” (“Winning the War of the World,” p. 10).   Picketty concerns himself with a real problem–  extreme inequality and the undermining of democracy–, but he does not see the deeper material irrationality of capitalism.

Capital in the Twenty-First Century is thus an important, but ultimately unsatisfying book.  Like the “equality of what debate”  that consumed Anglo-American political philosophy in the 1990’s and 2000’s, the book exposes the unjustifiable extent of inequality today, but does not work down to expose the depth normative and social problems of capitalism as a whole.  Picketty mentions “real democracy,” but does not tell us whether the institutions of “real democracy”  are the existing institutions freed from the distorting effects of extreme inequality, or new institutions.  Of economic democracy of the sort envisaged by, for example, Pat Devine, in Democracy and Economic Planning, he has nothing to say.  The impression one gets is that Picketty thinks that existing institutions are sufficient for real democracy, provided that the market forces that threaten them are constrained and regulated.  If so, then he needs to pose the question to himself:  if capitalism can be regulated by existing institutions, why are they currently being used to de-regulate it?  He knows the answer– they have been captured by ruling class interests.  Thus we return to the real issue, not inequality of wealth in the abstract, but class power dominating all of society for the sake of life-destructive increase of its money-value holdings.  Taxes cannot fix that problem, but only an alternative democratic life-economy based on the principle that resources are to be sustainably employed to comprehensively and universally satisfy the fundamental life-requirements of all people.

Politics of/and Reality

Written By: J.Noonan - Aug• 01•14

“All men by nature desire to know,”  begins Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which presupposes that we do not already know.  (Metaphysics, 980a19)  The system of the world is independent of the unreflective contents of our minds, and so we must discipline our thoughts, conduct them methodically, if we are to satisfy the desire to know.  Aristotle assumes that thought, properly conducted, will conform to the truth of objects, which further presupposes that people will let their preconceptions go if they should turn out to be disconfirmed by the world.  In the case of conduct as well as science, classical philosophy assumed a basic material rationality on the part of people:  if people understand reality, they will normally act in a way that conduces to their survival and happiness.  One may wish to fly by flapping one’s arms, but one will not thereby overcome the force of gravity.  One can still try, of course, but (depending upon one’s starting point) the consequences could prove fatal.

Perhaps surprisingly, the lethality of acting upon materially irrational opinions has rarely proven an obstacle to people’s conduct.  Why this seemingly anti-evolutionary drive to act according to desires either not grounded in or hubristically dismissive of objective reality has also long been understood.  Perhaps its first systematic elaboration was in the Antilogic of Protagoras. According to contemporary reports, the antilogic taught students “that there are two mutually opposed arguments on any subject.” (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers).  There may be a truth of the matter (an objective state of affairs), but well-conducted arguments can make it appear that the opposite of what is in fact the case is the case.  Since human beings are not mechanically determined to act, but move themselves on the basis of their own interpretations of the objective world confronting them, they can be persuaded to act even contrary to what is in fact the case.  “Human beings are the measure of all things– of things that are, that they are, and things that are not, that they are not,”  Protagoras argued.  (R.McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, p. 379).  Note that he does not say that human beings are the creators of all things, but the “measure” of all things.  That there is a world of objects independent of human beings Protagoras does not deny.  What he claims instead is that what things are or are not apart from human evaluations is of no consequence, since we act according to our judgements and interpretations, and these (as the antilogic teaches) in no way need to accurately reflect a “mind-independent”  reality in order to be convincing.

However much it might offend classical philosophical reason and its commitment to the truth come what may for self and factional interest, one cannot survey human history and fail to acknowledge that Protagoras has expressed an essential truth of political action.  Politics, in the Protagorean view, would be the art of constructing through argument a reality that suits and justifies factional purposes.  In human affairs, appearance of being the stronger argument and being the stronger argument coincide, because the stronger argment is the one that people act on, and the one that people act on is clearly not always the one that best models empirical reality or best serves long term interests.   Consciously or unconsciously, Karl Rove, in his much mocked dismissal of Ron Susskind of the New York Times and the “reality based community” in which he mockingly included Susskind, was echoing Protagoras’ insight.  Susskind relates the story:  “The aide [Rove] said that guys like me were ”in what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who ”believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. [Rove] cut me off. ”That’s not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. ”We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”  Whatever one thinks of the politics of Karl Rove and the Bush regime, his arguments should be taken seriously, because they contain an important truth (although the implications of that truth are the opposite of what Rove thought).

The truth, to reiterate, is that human society is not the mechanically determined result of objective physical-chemical-biological-genetic-psycho-physiological processes, but the ever-constructed and reconstructed product of human actions.  These actions presuppose the whole history of the evolution of matter-energy, but they are not determined in any direct way by those laws, because actions follow from interpretations and evaluations whose efficacy as motivations is by no means contingent upon their being objectively true.  The implication of the fact that we construct social-political reality from interpretations and evaluations, from Rove’s (and Protagoras’) perspective, is that those with political power can construct and reconstruct reality  to suit their purposes.  If reality can always be reconstructed to suit the purposes of the powerful, then it is impossible for critics to establish objective foundations for their criticism, which can always be rejected as merely a contrary opinion.

The real implication, which Rove misses or ignores, is that the empire builder’s construction of reality can ever be stable or permanent so long as it has not completely overcome or wiped out these contrary opinions.  Behind these contrary opinions is the material reality of opposed political forces, whose resistance to empire’s construction of reality contests the truth that ruling power seeks to construct.   The power to construct reality and define the truth is always a power that is contested.  In order to successfully establish their “truth,” the empire builders must refute their opponent’s claims.  So long as there are opponents, there will be disputes, and material reality (that which is objectively the case) appears able to re-enter the argument as the matter in dispute.  The matter in dispute between the ruling powers and their targets is whether and for whom the real life consequences of political actions are good and bad.

In order to find the ‘real-life-consequences” beneath the opposing arguments we have to isolate and focus upon the points where the arguments contradict each other.  It then seems to be an easy matter to resolve the contradiction-  we examine the real event around which opposed interpretations are built and determine which the available evidence better supports.  The problem is, however, that even in cases where the evidence is not disputed, the meaning or the ethical-political value of the evidence can be (and always is)  contested.  We get back to material reality only in order to have it slip away again.

As a result, and despite the hopes of “enlightenment principles,” political conflicts are almost never resolved by the force of the better argument.  People do not consider evidence apart from the question of what the evidence is supposed to support, with the result that the same empirical evidence can be cited by opposed sides as proof of opposed judgements.  To take a generic example from the 2014 Gaza war, the same pile of bodies can be cited as evidence that Israel is committing war crimes, and that it is doing everything it can to avoid civilian casualties.  The unlimited multiplication of testimonials and perspectives made possible by social media does not help resolve the argument.  It does not matter how much evidence there is if that evidence is always going to be interpreted relative to a political position whose truth is treated as absolute.  No matter how high the pile of Palestinian bodies grows, it will always be interpreted by the Israeli side as proof of the savagery of Hamas.  It is not that people deny the existence of the objects cited as evidence, but (worse) that the meaning of those objects is always taken to confirm the truth of one’s own position.  No evidence is ruled out of court, but it is always spun so as to support one’s own position.  The goal here is not necessarily to win the argument outright, but to keep it going forever, thus preventing an effective judgement being passed against one’s own side (ever being convicted of war crimes, to continue with the example)

The opponents of empire might respond:  so what, enlightenment reason is at best naïve and at worst complicit with the structure of power which is the problem.  I do not think the political implications of the incapacity of knowledge and reason to overcome ruling power is so happy.  If rational persuasion and objective evidence fail to constrain the ruling powers, there is only force of arms left.  The fight may be dignified and justified, but comes at extraordinary cost (as Gaza is again proving) and without compromising in any serious way the structure of power and violence it opposes.

Self-Defence, Democracy, and Moral Equivalence

Written By: J.Noonan - Jul• 23•14

As with the past two Gaza invasions, supporters of Israel have relied upon three central arguments to justify the destruction of Palestinians’ lives and means of life.   None are sound and all need to be publically contested.

The first and most widely deployed argument is that Israel is simply exercising its right to self defence.  This is the most common argument because it is the most plausible, seems to conform to international laws and norms, and involves the fewest number of odious moral implications.  Here is the argument:  Hamas is using Gaza as a base to launch  rockets at Israel.  Israeli cities and civilians are endangered by the rockets.  As a sovereign nation Israel has the right to self-defence.  The right to self-defence includes the right to decide the most efficacious means of self-defence.  Only a ground invasion can ensure the safety of Israeli civilians from Hamas rocket fire.  Therefore, a ground invasion is necessary.

A corollary of this argument relates to the civilian casualties in Gaza.  The corollary asserts that Hamas is responsible for all Palestinian deaths, because Hamas started the conflict.

This argument appears sound because there is in fact a right to self-defence under international law.  There are also norms concerning proportionality, however, which the scope and violence of Israeli operations arguably violate.  However, arguing about the finer points of international law is not the most effective line of criticism, because, as history proves, international law in effect means whatever those with the power to enforce it decide it means.  Hence, we need to expose the problematic assumptions that underlie the right to self-defence argument.

The first assumption is that Hamas is the cause of the conflict.  Hamas is not the cause of the conflict; they are not initiating military operations, they are reacting to an embargo on life goods and the imprisoning of an entire people by Israel.  They have said that their goal is to end the siege of their life space.  No people could reasonably be expected not to resist conditions such as Israel has imposed upon the people of Gaza.  One can debate both the wisdom and the legality of rocket fire into the territory of a militarily superior nation, but it is not possible to plausibly deny that the cause of the rocket fire is the inhuman conditions of life that the Israeli blockade imposes on Gazans.   People are safest when they give their neighbours no cause for violence.  I am much less likely to fight with my neighbour if I do not barricade his driveway.  If I barricade his driveway, beat him up the first time he asks me to remove the blockade, reinforce the blockade with concrete the second time he asks me to remove it, and burn his house down the third time, I could hardly pretend to not be responsible if he should, the fourth time, decide to respond more forcefully towards me.  I might plead self-defence, but really, I am defending myself from the predictable consequences of my own actions.  Hence, because the blockade is the real cause of the violence, and Israeli’s have built and maintained the blockade, they bear ultimate responsibility for the state of war between Gaza and Israel, the self-defence argument fails.  If the blockade were ended (and a comprehensive peace agreement reached) Gazans and all Palestinians could get on with building intrinsically valuable lives in which the energy used to sustain historical enmities and hatreds is sublimated.  Israeli’s too, for that matter.

The second argument is far more problematic, but much loved of Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Baird.  Baird often argues that Israel  should never be criticized, whether for its military incursions, its apartheid wall, its collective punishments, its detentions, or any other indignity or abuse it decides to heap upon the Palestinians, because it is a democracy.  This argument rests on a category mistake. The category mistake is that Baird uses a political structure as moral justification for life-destructive outcomes (the death of Palestinian children) that would otherwise be judged immoral and criminal.   Democracy is nothing but a form of government, a structure of rule, a way of taking collectively binding decisions.  It is not, in and of itself, a justification for the outcomes of the decisions it takes.  If the mere fact that a decision were taken democratically were sufficient justification for its outcomes, then nothing that a majority supported could ever be morally wrong.   But the justification of political decisions, their moral legitimacy, depends upon the life outcomes for the people affected.  A decision to bomb and shell densely populated areas in full knowledge that there will be innocent civilian casualties is wrong because it knowingly and necessarily destroys innocent life.  That it has popular support does not make it morally correct.  Democracy is a political form, whether it is good or bad depends upon the degree to which those affected by its decisions are enable to lead good human lives.

Two brief addenda.  It is questionable whether Israel can be both a “Jewish state”  and a liberal democracy, at the very least religio-ethnic exclusivity is in tension with the liberal ideal of equal citizenship.  Arab citizens have the same formal rights as Jewish citizens, but how can they be equal in a state that identifies itself as essentially Jewish?   The issue is complex and I leave it to others and to a different time to resolve.  My point is only that the issue of Israeli democracy is more problematic than it might appear.  If the question of Israeli democracy is more complex than it first appears, then the question of Hamas’ political illegitimacy is even moreso.  The Western media typically play down the fact that Hamas was democratically elected in the 2006 elections to the Palestinian parliament.  So maybe it is not true, for either or both of these reasons, that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East.

The final, and by far the most odious and dangerous argument in support of Israel asserts that there is “no moral equivalence” between Israeli deaths from Hamas rocket fire and Palestinian deaths from Israeli  fire.  The only way this argument could be true is if Israeli lives are worth more than Palestinian lives.  Equivalence implies equality of value.  By definition, then, inequivalence (which is what “no moral equivalence” entails) means inequality of value.  Inequality of value means that one of the two poles of comparison is worth more than the other.  If there is no moral equivalence between Palestinian and Israeli deaths,  then Israeli deaths are worth more, i.e., are morally worse than, Palestinian deaths.  If death is bad because life is good, and some deaths are worse than others,  then, by implication, some lives are better than others.  If the living and the dead are sorted into reified groups  (‘Israeli,’ ‘Palestinian’) and this sorting is mapped onto to the inequivalent valuation, then the conclusion is that Israeli lives are worth more than Palestinian lives.  And that is, quite simply, a repetition of the most odious and inhuman racism that has periodically infected human history.

Let us now put all three arguments together and see the hell to which it leads.  If we accept that a)  Israel has an unlimited right to self-defence, b) whose exercise is legitimated by its being a democracy, and c) is therefore entitled to kill Palestinians whose lives are worth less than Israeli lives, then we are led, logically, to the conclusion that if a majority of Israeli’s so agreed, their right to self-defence would entail the right to destroy the entire Palestinian people (their lives are not worth as much as the lives of Israelis they might kill, the right to self-determination is not constrained by extraneous factors but only the democratic decision of the people of Israel).

Sadly, political discourse in Israel is degenerating towards such conclusion.  An Israeli news outlet reported that Knesset member Ayelet Shaked: “a well-known Israeli politician and parliament member, recently said mothers of all Palestinians should also be killed during the Israeli assault on Gaza. She called for the slaughter of Palestinian mothers who give birth to “little snakes.””

If, as I hope, you reject the exterminist logic implied in Shaked’s comment, or openly asserted in a ruling of Rabbi Dov Lior, reported in Haaretz, that ” “deterrent measures to exterminate the enemy” were allowed by Jewish religious law, then you need to rethink the soundness (should you have been tempted by them) of the 3 arguments above that open the door to it.

Politics. Ambivalence.

Written By: J.Noonan - Jul• 18•14

Even by the standards of real politik it is extraordinarily cynical to use the nightmarish crash of a passenger plane as cover for an invasion.  Yet it happened:  as the world watched in astonished horror the burning wreckage of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, aflame in a field in Eastern Ukraine, Israel launched its anticipated ground assault on Gaza.   In reaction, Hamas turned to its well-worn repertoire of promises to “exact a heavy price”  from Israel, but we all know how this will end.  The smaller man sees that there is no avoiding the fight now, so he resists with the only weapon he has left– his mouth.  But it will not save him from having his teeth knocked out.

Perhaps it is time to abandon tough guy politics.  The tough guys in eastern Ukraine have now, probably inadvertently, (but what is the difference?)  killed 295 people on a 777.  The tough guys of Hamas have gotten themselves into another war with Israel that they cannot win.  The tough guys of Israel have killed over 200 Palestinians, mostly civilians, all the while claiming not to be tough guys but forced into the fight by the mouthy little guy they regularly beat up.  The tough guy Putin scrambles for excuses–  had there not been a war in Ukraine, the plane would not have been shot down, which is rather like saying that if a person did not need to breathe, they would not have drowned.  True, but rather too abstract as an explanation.  Punch, counter-punch, counter-counter-punch…

It is quite the show, and a good thing too, since the World Cup just ended.  Those with a front row seat are enjoying it most.  While the world is told by the Western media that all of Israel is cowering from the rockets of the mighty Hamas, CNN cameras infelicitously caught a large group of Israelis sitting on a hill, only a few miles from Gaza, cheering the show as Israeli guided missiles lazily glided towards their targets (there is no rush when there are no defenses to skirt).

The reality of a neighbour’s house exploding or bodies falling on my patio from the sky are too impossible to imagine.  Across the street, some kids are joking in the late afternoon sunshine.  I think– “but don’t they know what happened?”  But even as I think that another voice is saying “if they do know, that is no reason to not enjoy the evening.”  I look into the garden.  The gently fading sunlight has dulled the green of leaves and creeping charley and brightened the reds, yellows, and purples of the crocosmia, lilies, and echinacia.  I can sip my beer and ponder the miseries of the world at leisure.  I think back (more than twenty years) to a poster on the wall of my old comrade Peter’s basement apartment on Lansdowne Ave.  It was a quotation from Trotsky, in exile in Mexico City, remarking on the pleasure he felt looking into the garden, through the window his wife Natasha just opened.  I only remember the final line:  “Life is beautiful.  May future generations enjoy it to the fullest.”

Ever the revolutionary, he speaks of the future, but he enjoyed his present in Coyoacan as well.  He enjoyed his garden, and he enjoyed the even more beautiful garden of Frida Kahlo’s Casa Azul, (not to mention Kahlo herself), only a few blocks away.  The only justification for struggle is to enable everyone to enjoy the beauty of life, but the means of struggle must be such that the inner capacity to value life and beauty are not destroyed. (I think Trotsky, former commander of the Red Army and proponent of the politics of ‘liquidating the class enemy,’ once on the run from Stalin’s homicidal mania, came to understand this truth).  Whether true or not of Trotsky, the principle does emphasize what might be the worst, cruelest irony of all-  the more intransigent the opponents of justice, the more violence they are willing to use, the more those fighting for their humanity are forced to adopt inhuman means, killing in themselves that for which they struggle-  liberation of the capacity to fully enjoy the beauty of life.

The comfortable can wish for the democratic mass movement that can conquer oppression through solidarity, commitment, and militant but non-violent struggle.  Perhaps they think back to their support for the struggle against apartheid, but their recollections probably pass over Umkhonto we Sizwe.  Nevertheless, there is a lesson:  there was armed struggle against apartheid, but the ultimate victory was secured by political power, not military maneuvering.  It was the political wing of the ANC, in combination with the Communist Party of South Africa and the millions of militant workers of the Congress of South African  Trade Unions that brought white rule to an end.  The Pan African Congress and its slogan “One settler, one bullet” have been forgotten.  The socio-economic problems that beset apartheid South Africa remain, but so too millions of black workers alive to continue the fight.

I know that no one has the map we need to find our way out of the morass we are in, but there is no excuse, at this point in history, for persisting in means of struggle that we know not to work.  Shooting down aircraft, plowing them into buildings, lobbing rockets in the hope of killing someone, anyone, accomplishes nothing, save giving your oppressors the excuse they need to step on your throat all the harder.  Others have to help remove the boot, which is why, I suppose, those not in immediate danger shouldn’t laugh or enjoy the lazy summer twilight.  But that does not mean that the laughter and light are not beautiful.

The Value and Contradictions of Self-Determination

Written By: J.Noonan - Jul• 14•14

If you imprison and humiliate an entire people, let them live (at your discretion) but not make the sort of living that human beings are capable of making for themselves when they control their means of life, they will, eventually, fight back.  If you humiliate them deeply enough, if you build roadblocks in the way of every political solution, if you pontificate whilst raining death at will, the humiliated will lash out in anger and call for your destruction, even though they and you both know that will never happen.  If you also control the means of communication, if you can get journalists to tell a ‘balanced’ story by focussing  on ‘rockets’ in abstraction from historical realities like colonization and inhuman blockades of life-necessities;  if you can prevent the obvious question from being asked:  what group of human beings would not fight back under these conditions (if they did not fight back, they would not be human), then you can make yourself appear the victim, you can get everyone to sing same from the same hymn-book of the ‘right to self-defence.’   Better, you can kill and destroy just enough that there will be a bit left over to justify the next year’s bombing mission or invasion, to sob that you have ‘no partner for peace,’ to hypocritically moan that the people you torment and abuse and humiliate do not recognise your ‘right to exist’ (while openly announcing that you will never accept the one thing that might bring peace, a Palestinian state).  And so it goes on (forever?), Israel, the world’s last colonial power, claiming the right to determine its collective future by denying the same right to others.

Such is the contradiction the universalization of the right to self-determination causes.  If the ‘self’ refers to  singular peoples each struggling as ethno-national wholes for exclusive control over the same territory, then the result can never be self-determination for each, but either war or subordination of the weaker to the stronger. It is impossible to satisfy the geographical conditions of self-determination for each group, since that over which exclusive jurisdiction is demanded as a fundamental condition of self-determination cannot be shared.

One way of resolving this contradiction is to argue that ethno-national groups (or their sectarian-religious analogues) are anachronistic, not to mention atavistic, xenophobic, and chauvinistic.  Even at their least violent (as in Scotland or Quebec) they seem, at best, a faint echo of a now impossible (and unattractive?) Romantic idea of the nation as the expression of a unique popular culture.  Since there is no avoiding the danger that struggles for self-determination focus only on the well-being of one group at the expense of the other;  the goal of territorial security should be abandoned as an artefact of the ‘tribal’ past.

At the same time, however, as the case of the Palestinians proves, the struggles of particular nationals selves for self-determination  remains of universal value.  Stateless people are profoundly vulnerable because they are denied control over even the most basic elements of being alive– accessing water supplies, having secure access to agricultural land.  We are not in the age of  Deleuzian ‘de-territorialized flows.’  Resources and money flow from one territory to another territory, and controlling those flows are named entities– Israel, America, the European Union, the “global North.”  In opposition are not Hardt and Negri’s ‘multitudes,” but again, people with names:  Palestinian, Uighur, Kurd. People still name themselves and the places they live, and assign preponderant political value to protecting both, not necessarily on chauvinistic grounds, but as a basic condition of life-security.  Life grows from the ground up.  If you do not control that ground, you live only at the pleasure of the group that does.  That is not a situation in which human life can flourish.

The problem with cosmopolitan alternatives (liberal or socialist) to the ethno-nationalist form of struggles for self-determination is that people must live someplace rather than another.  Even nomads stop their journeys and camp for a night, a week, a season, and their wanderings are limited to a territory that they regard as their own.  No one can live everywhere; a cosmopolis, a world city, is, as Kant stressed, an ideal to regulate the intercourse of strangers (welcome everyone everywhere in shared humanity)  but  it is not a home or a possible political structure in which its citizens collectively determine their lives.  Yes, all states are situated on planet earth, and yes, we do have shared concerns as human beings, but day to day politics needs to regulate day to day life, and day to day life plays out in a locality.  Humanity is a concrete, not an abstract, universal.  We are human in virtue of the actual identities we build for ourselves.  Localities have boundaries that not only separate life spaces from one another, they define the familiar and the shared (and of course all the problems intrinsic to human societies).  These boundaries should be porous and people should cross frontiers, intra-national problems are not solved by nationalist means, but the historical reality is that when a people does not control its own basic conditions of life some other people does, and has used this power to make the dependent their servants, not to mention objects to be destroyed when the subordinate insist upon their humanity and thus their right to self-determination.   Behind the demand for ethno-nationalist self-determination is the truly universal demand to control life-requirements for the sake of living as free human beings.

People do in fact identify themselves by a name they share with some but not with others.  Yes, the communities in relation to which these identities are forged are largely imaginary (Benedict Anderson), but the imaginary is made real by political commitment and history.   Part of what motivates political commitment to an imaginary community is the very real material violence that indigenous and non-European identities have suffered over the past three or four hundred years at the hands of colonising, imperialist forces and their regional allies.  Not only has nationalist struggle been the primary form of opposition to imperialism, it has also bound different people together across borders in a shared, international struggle.  Victory in those struggles is protective of the local identities out of which creative hybrids are built.  Struggles for secure territory are not necessarily chauvinistic and violently exclusionary, they can be the starting point for new, multicultural constructions.

The ultimate implication of the demand for self-determination is the expansion of the ‘self’ beyond national identity to new forms of global sharing of life-space and life-resources.  But the historical reality of the world is distinction into stateless and citizens, colonisers and colonised, rulers and ruled.  Palestinians, Israelis, Iranians, Americans all have the same fundamental conditions of being alive and acting freely, but not the same power to procure the resources that would satisfy those conditions.  In the given historical moment, a national state is an essential step in the direction of the universal sharing that would finally solve the problem of subordinate peoples, because the achievement of a national state presupposes a political victory over the forces of domination.

Still, when the struggle for territory occurs between two groups who both claim the same territory, as in Israel-Palestine, the conflict can very quickly lose all connection to the struggle for the material conditions of self-determination and appear as an irreconcilable conflict fuelled by fictional histories purified of the truth of contradiction and complexity the existence of the other interconnected history necessarily introduces.   The starting point to resolving the contradiction of competing struggles for self-determination is to acknowledge the existence of the other self and that there is no singular history, but that the history of the one identity is bound up with the other and vice versa. How far the world can develop beyond borders is an open question, but the importance of establishing them in cases  where peoples have historically been subordinated to the rule of other peoples (as still today in Palestine), seems indisputable.




Windsor, WUFA, and Hard Bargaining: A Lament From Up Close for the Decline of Campus Democracy:

Written By: J.Noonan - Jul• 04•14

Collective bargaining is a difficult process.  At its best, it is a rare opportunity for workers to participate in the determination of their conditions of work, rather than simply accept whatever conditions are offered. Collective bargaining allows workers to deliberate together as a democratic body about how they think their work should be organized and compensated and to make their case to the employer.  Despite what employers publicly maintain, there is no equality of power.  Since employers retain ultimate legal control over the workplace, since they continue to draw full salary during any work stoppage, and since the legislative deck is stacked in their favour, without solidarity, both between members of the bargaining unity and between the bargaining unit and the wider community of labour and concerned citizens, the employer is typically in an advantaged position.

That does not stop employers from playing the victim card.  Ontario has just come through an election campaign in which the leader of  the Conservative Party tried to spook Ontarians with takes of the nefarious deeds of phantom “union bosses”  holding the province hostage.  Fortunately, Ontarians saw through this nonsense and sent him packing.   One would hope that thoughtful people would draw the appropriate lesson:  one should try to convince by argument and not by demonizing threat.  Sadly, my employer, the University of Windsor, seems determined to try to resolve the on-going round of collective bargaining with my union, the Windsor University Faculty Association, by the time honoured tactic of union blaming.

In a letter to the Faculty dated July 3rd, 2014, President Alan Wildeman wrote: “It is now more than five months since my January 28th public address when I expressed to the campus community the desire going forward to have new collective agreements in place at the time the existing ones expire. This was done with the goal of breaking the persistent pattern of negotiations carrying on through the summer, and bargaining groups either threatening or taking strike action in the fall. This is a pattern that causes tremendous anxiety for students, their families and the greater community. While this pattern may represent the tried and true tradition of collective bargaining and forcing an employer’s hand, and unions might think it appropriate to threaten strike action at a time when it puts the most pressure on the employer, it is a pattern that the University cannot continue to quietly accept.”

I suppose we should be proud that the administration, by threatening (but so far not acting upon the threat) to lock us out at the earliest possible moment is copying our purported tactics.  For of course, the summer is when they have greatest leverage. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.   Still, while it is in fact the case that bargaining has often stretched from May until October, it has never been the explicit strategy of WUFA to back administration into a corner.  We have been on strike exactly twice in 50 years and we have never gone into bargaining with a strike mandate in hand.  We have only taken strike votes in the face of protracted impasses at the bargaining table over issues of fundamental importance to the membership.

Why, then, has bargaining often stretched into the fall?  The answer is that both sides have too often brought so many items to the table that it took that long to work through them all in a responsible manner.  It is of course true that any academic uni0n is in a more powerful position in the Fall, when a full slate of classes is running, than in the summer, when many members are away from campus and fewer classes are offered.  Nevertheless, despite the nightmares of right-wing pundits, university faculties are not full of rabid leftists chomping at the bit to prosecute the class struggle  (there are a few of us still left, but I can assure everyone we are in a small minority).  Most faculty members care most about their research and their teaching, they do not want either interrupted by either lockouts or strikes, and most are loath to engage in struggles that might harm the reputation of the institutions in which their own reputations as academics are forged.  You really have to push academics hard to anger them enough as a collective to make them want to strike (or a strongly resist an imposed lockout). 

It would seem that President Wildeman is working hard to push us in that direction.  While the lockout date has come and gone and the university’s doors are still open to WUFA members,  his letter of July 3rd threatens changes to the conditions of employment if WUFA does not acquiesce to administration demands by Monday, July 7th.  Specifically, it warns that:

“The University will no longer make employer contributions to the Money Purchase Plan component of the Faculty Pension Plan (Article D of collective agreement);

ii) The University will cease to pay the premiums for all health insurance benefit coverages for WUFA members described in Article F of the collective agreement, including the Green Shield Supplemental Hospitalization Benefit Plan and Green Shield Extended Health Benefit Plan;

iii) The Grievance and Arbitration provisions in Article 39 of the collective agreement will no longer be in effect;

iv) The University will cease to honour requests for reimbursement of Professional Development and Membership Dues described in Article I of the collective agreement;

v) The University will cease collecting union dues from members and forwarding those dues to WUFA (Article 4:01 and 4:02).”

Now, on one level, these changes are not alarming, for they are changes that would occur in the case of a lockout.  What is most disconcerting is that they were unexpectedly thrown into the room when it appeared that both sides were making progress by negotiating and not threatening.  Both teams bargained past the lockout deadline and had scheduled meetings for the next day.  The assumption  amongst members– naïve, as it turned out– was that both sides had found common ground and were splitting the differences that get split for the sake of reaching an agreement with which everyone can live.

Rather than contribute constructively to the talks, the President’s letter accuses the union of distorting the University’s finances and ignoring the economic realities of the province of Ontario:

“We continue to be advised by WUFA’s bargaining team that it is their steadfast view that the university does not face a financial challenge, and that they should not have to do as all other employees have done. In contrast to the position of WUFA’s bargaining team, our fiscal challenge, as evidenced by $43M of realignments over the past six years and reductions in faculty and staff numbers, is real. It is a challenge being felt across the provincial and national postsecondary system, and it is a challenge clearly articulated in the provincial policy on differentiation across the university and college sector.”

I will not get into the specifics of WUFA’s analysis of the University’s finances here, save to note that the same university that has cut 43 million dollars from its operating budget (which is what “realignment” means)  has embarked on an ambitious building program that will cost well in excess of 100 million dollars by the time it is complete.  One can argue, as the President does, that this money was specifically earmarked for capital improvements and is thus not money taken from the Operating Budget.  Even if one accepts that argument as a matter of accounting practices, the fact remains that money is being found for construction at a time when the university has not been hiring at a pace to keep up with retirements.  As a consequence,  faculty student ratios are increasing even though overall enrolment increases have been modest.  The real issue is priorities, not accounting tables.

As for the provincial situation, the President is correct to argue that all post-secondary institutions across the province are facing real challenges to their finances.  Yet, these challenges have nothing to do with purportedly unreasonable faculty salary demands and everything to do with:  a) decades of inappropriate taxation policy which has redistributed income to the richest Ontarians while starving vital public institutions of needed funds and b) a provincial post-secondary education policy which has put universities in competition with colleges and universities in competition with each other to attract students.  These provincial  policies, made worse by the long inadequacy of federal transfer payments in support of essential public institutions, explain whatever financial challenges we face, and should, if everyone is committed to the university’s intellectual and pedagogical missions, be ground for common cause.  

Whether or not it was ever practiced in reality, the principle of collegial self-governance is the goal to which universities should aspire.  Unlike for profit businesses, universities do not have owners whose goal is to maximise profits.  Instead, all members of the institution–  faculty, librarians, learning specialists, lab technicians, students, support workers, and administration have the same goal—the advance of human knowledge and creativity in the widest and most comprehensive sense.  If that claim is true, then it should follow that all the groups who together make up the university ought to cooperate (not without respectful disagreement) in the determination of the budgets, policies, rules, and goals that guide the institution’s mission. The best ideas emerge through deliberative and democratic argument—no one group knows best just because of the position they occupy in the hierarchy.

Collegial self-governance should be the goal, but we all know from experience that it is increasingly distant from reality.  At the University of Windsor, as at other universities across the country, the norm is too often imperious, top-down imposition of senior administration’s plans.  True, we are sometimes “consulted,”  but consultation is the prerogative of monarchs.  Engaged discussion, argument, and collective decision-making by all with a stake in the outcome ought to be the practice of democratic public institutions (as well as the organizing principle of collective bargaining).

Sadly, (because I am thankful every day that this university allows me to teach, to have felt the joy of helping thousands of students to pursue truth rather than expediency, and to be a philosopher), I do not see much evidence of commitment at senior levels to this principle.  I have no doubt that senior administration is sincere in its commitment to what it considers the institution to be, but the university is not a name, a ‘brand,’ or a collection of buildings.  It is the work of teaching, learning, and research.  Everything else, including administration, is a support function, important, yes, but support, not the raison d’ etre.